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Competitive Annexation Among Municipalities: North Carolina
Adopts the Prior Jurisdiction Rule
Annexation, the process by which a municipality extends its boundaries to
include outlying areas,' is usually an attractive prospect to both the annexing
municipality and the territory being annexed. The main benefit to citizens in the
annexed area is that after annexation they receive city services and access to city
facilities.2 Through annexation, the city forces persons in fringe areas who often
use municipal services to share the tax burden of those services. 3 Furthermore,
annexation ensures that the development of fringe areas is not inconsistent with
city planning objectives. 4
Annexation has been a major factor in the growth of North Carolina cities.5
From 1917 to 1947, there were 225 special legislative acts extending municipal
corporate boundaries in North Carolina.6 In the seven year period from 1970 to
1977, annexations by cities with populations over 2500 accounted for 1480 cor-
porate boundary extensions.7 Annually, about one-half of North Carolina's cit-
1. Note, Annexation-North Carolina's Referendum Procedure-Texi Industries, Inc. v. City
of Fayetteville, 17 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 765, 767-68 (1981).
2. NORTH CAROLINA ASSOCIATION OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS & NORTH CAROLINA
LEAGUE OF MUNICIPALITIES, REPORT OF THE JOINT ANNEXATION STUDY COMMISSION OF THE
NORTH CAROLINA ASSOCIATION OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS AND THE NORTH CAROLINA
LEAGUE OF MUNICIPALITIES 21 (1980) [hereinafter cited as NORTH CAROLINA ASSOCIATION OF
COUNTY COMMISSIONERS]; NORTH CAROLINA BAR ASSOCIATION, LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW
VI-11 to -12 (1959) (quoting MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT STUDY COMMISSION, SUPPLEMENTARY
REPORT OF MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT STUDY COMMISSION 5 (1959)).
3. DEPARTMENT OF URBAN STUDIES NATIONAL LEAGUE OF CITIES, ADJUSTING MUNICI-
PAL BOUNDARIES 1-2 (1966), reprinted in SELECTED MATERIALS ON MUNICIPAL ANNEXATION 78-
79 (W. Wicker ed. 1980). N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-58.10 (1982) provides that an annexed area is
subject to immediate taxation by the annexing authority.
4. According to a 1958 study, problems may arise in uncontrolled fringe areas:
We have viewed with alarm the experience in other states where failure of cities to expand
their boundaries periodically has resulted in what is called the "metropolitan problem."
We have analyzed what can happen if a city is surrounded by heavily populated fringe
areas that cannot for a variety of reasons be annexed by the city. We have noted fringe
areas that are, in every sense of the word, slums. We have noted fringe areas whose
problems of sanitation and traffic and law enforcement are so great that cities are discour-
aged from attempting annexation. We have noted fringe areas so poorly developed that the
city finds it impossible to extend water and sewer facilities through these areas to serve
presently undeveloped land that could accommodate sound development.
MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT STUDY COMMISSION, REPORT OF MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT STUDY
COMMISSION 19 (1958), reprinted in SELECTED MATERIALS ON MUNICIPAL ANNEXATION 41 (W.
Wicker ed. 1980). See also A. COATES, INTRODUCTION TO GOVERNMENT IN NORTH CAROLINA,
21-22 (tracing the history of municipal growth in North Carolina and observing that when fringe
areas came to be "sufficiently near to affect the health of the inhabitants of the town," the town's
limits were inevitably extended); ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS,
ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO GOVERNMENTAL REORGANIZATION IN METROPOLITAN AREAS
63 (1962), reprinted in SELECTED MATERIALS ON MUNICIPAL ANNEXATION 72 (W. Wicker ed.
1980) ("[i]f uncontrolled, [fringe] areas can be a source of trouble and cost for the entire area-the
residents of the fringe area as well as the annexing city").
5. NORTH CAROLINA ASSOCIATION OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS, supra note 2, at 11.
6. Id. at 12. Until 1947 the only way to annex territory to a municipality was by special act of
the general assembly. Abbott v. Town of Highlands, 52 N.C. App. 69, 73, 277 S.E.2d 820, 823, cert.
denied, 303 N.C. 710, 283 S.E.2d 136 (1981).
7. NORTH CAROLINA ASSOCIATION OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS, supra note 2, at 17.
ies make three annexations each.8 In this flurry of annexation activity the
boundaries of North Carolina's cities move closer to one another, increasing the
likelihood that two or more municipalities will want to annex the same fringe
area. Under North Carolina statutes more than one municipality may have au-
thority to annex the same territory;9 thus, a conflict might ensue if two or more
municipalities take action at once.
The North Carolina Supreme Court has resolved two such conflicts. In
Town of Hudson v. City of Lenoir10 and in City of Burlington v. Town of Elon
College," the court had to determine which of two competing annexation at-
tempts would prevail. The Hudson court considered the nature of the compet-
ing proceedings and chose a "voluntary" proceeding over an "involuntary"
one. 12 In 1984 the court in Burlington explicitly overruled the Hudson decision,
holding that the "winner" of the race for annexation is the first municipality
officially to begin its proceedings, regardless of the type of proceedings in-
volved. 13 The Burlington court thus adopted the prior jurisdiction rule, which
had been long recognized elsewhere as dispositive of disputes between munici-
palities over annexation of the same territory.14
In the Hudson case the town of Hudson sought to extend its boundaries
under statutes permitting unilateral, involuntary annexation, 15 a type of annexa-
tion that does not require the consent of residents in the area to be annexed. The
city of Lenoir, responding to a petition from residents of the area to be annexed,
sought to annex the same territory pursuant to the voluntary procedure pre-
scribed by section 160A-31 of the North Carolina General Statutes. 16 The court
temporarily restrained both municipalities from pursuing their proceedings. Af-
ter the restraining order was lifted, both municipalities simultaneously began
8. Id. at 16.
9. For a discussion of statutory annexation methods in North Carolina and jurisdictional req-
uisites for annexation, which may be satisfied by more than one municipality, see infra notes 25-42
and accompanying text.
10. 279 N.C. 156, 181 S.E.2d 443 (1971).
11. 310 N.C. 723, 314 S.E.2d 534 (1984).
12. "Voluntary" proceedings are those initiated by the residents of an area proposed for annex-
ation. "Involuntary" annexations proceed regardless of the desire or consent of those residents. See
infra notes 28-42 and accompanying text.
13. Burlington, 310 N.C. at 730, 314 S.E.2d at 538.
14. See, eg., Borghi v. Board of Supervisors, 133 Cal. App. 2d 463, 284 P.2d 537 (1955); City
of Daytona Beach v. City of Port Orange, 165 So. 2d 768 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1964); City of Musca-
tine v. Waters, 251 N.W.2d 544 (Iowa 1977); Pfeiffer v. City of Louisville, 240 S.W.2d 560 (Ky.
1951); State ex rel. Orono v. Village of Long Lake, 274 Minn. 264, 77 N.W.2d 46 (1956); Sugar
Creek v. City of Independence, 466 S.W.2d 100 (Mo. CL App. 1971); City of West Fargo v. City of
Fargo, 251 N.W.2d 918 (N.D. 1977); State ex rel. Winn v. City of San Antonio, 259 S.W.2d 248
(Tex. Civ. App. 1953); Town of Greenfield v. City of Milwaukee, 259 Wis. 77, 47 N.W.2d 292
(1951). But see VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-1037(a) (1981) (Virginia statutes do not follow the prior
jurisdiction rule and instead provide that if there is an annexation dispute, "the court in which the
original proceedings are pending... shall consolidate the cases and hear them together, and shall
make such decision as is just taking into consideration the interest of all parties to each case.").
15. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 160A-33 to -56 (1982 & Supp. 1983) provide for involuntary annexa-
tion; §§ 160A-33 to -44 govern involuntary annexations by cities of fewer than 5000 persons; and
§§ 160A-45 to -56 govern involuntary annexations by cities of 5000 or more. Because it was popu-
lated by fewer than 5000 persons, the Town of Hudson used §§ 160A-33 to -44 in its attempted
involuntary annexation.
16. Id. § 160A-31 (1982).
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new annexations; thus, neither proceeding was commenced before the other.
Searching for a basis on which to declare that one of the proceedings would
prevail, the court examined the nature of the two proceedings and noted that
statutes for voluntary annexation allow for quicker completion of proceedings
than do statutes for involuntary annexation. 17 The court concluded that the
general assembly preferred an annexation that had the blessing of the landown-
ers and ruled that the voluntary annexation prevailed over the simultaneously
begun involuntary one. 18 Because the two annexation attempts had been initi-
ated simultaneously, the Hudson court could not give priority based on a first-to-
start rule. The court, however, did not limit its holding to simultaneously begun
annexations; instead, the court suggested that voluntary proceedings would al-
ways be given priority. 19
In Burlington20 the North Carolina Supreme Court faced another contest
between an involuntary and a voluntary proceeding. Unlike Hudson, in which
neither of two competing proceedings clearly had been begun first, the town of
Burlington had initiated its involuntary proceedings for annexing a territory
before the town of Elon College ever received a petition from the territory's
residents to begin voluntary proceedings. Nonetheless, Elon College completed
its proceedings first. Burlington brought suit alleging that it had prior jurisdic-
tion over the territory and, therefore, that Elon College's activities were null and
void. The North Carolina Supreme Court accepted Burlington's reasoning, re-
jected the Hudson court's holding that voluntary annexation proceedings are
"more equal" than involuntary ones, and adopted instead the rule of prior
jurisdiction. 2 1
Under the prior jurisdiction rule, when "separate equivalent proceedings
relat[e] to the same subject matter, that one which is prior in time is prior in
jurisdiction to the exclusion of those subsequently instituted."'22 A proceeding is
"prior in time" if it is initiated before another; the proceeding is initiated when
17. Hudson, 279 N.C. at 161, 181 S.E.2d at 447.
18. See id. at 161-62, 181 S.E.2d at 447.
19. See id. The Hudson court cited no cases for support and one case to the contrary. The
contrary case, which the court cited with the signal "but see," was Town of Clive v. Colby, 255 Iowa
483, 123 N.W.2d 331 (1963) (supplemental opinion).
20. City of Burlington v. Town of Elon College, 310 N.C. 723, 314 S.E.2d 534 (1984).
21. Id. at 728-30, 314 S.E.2d at 537-39. Had the Hudson court restricted its holding to cases in
which an involuntary and voluntary proceeding began simultaneously, the Burlington court could
have limited Hudson to the facts of the case. Because the Hudson holding went beyond the facts of
the case, however, the Burlington court had to overrule Hudson to adopt the prior jurisdiction doc-
trine. To the extent that Hudson is still good law, it applies only when multiple annexation attempts
are simultaneously begun.
22. 2 E. McQUILLIN, THE LAW OF MUNIcIPAL CORPORATIONS § 7.22(a), at 377 (3d rev. ed.
1979). The prior jurisdiction rule
applies, generally speaking, to and among proceedings for the municipal incorporation,
annexation, or consolidation of a particular territory, i.e., in proceedings of this character,
while the [proceeding] first commenced is pending, jurisdiction to consider and determine
others concerning the same territory is excluded. Thus, where two or more bodies or tribu-
nals have concurrent jurisdiction over a subject matter, the one first acquiring jurisdiction
may proceed, and subsequent purported assumptions of jurisdiction in the premises are a
nullity.
Id. at 377-78.
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the "first mandatory public procedural step" is taken.2 3 Applying the prior ju-
risdiction rule to the Burlington facts, the supreme court found that Burlington
took the first mandatory public procedural step by following the first directive of
the statute pursuant to which it annexed-adopting a resolution of intent to
annex.24 Because adoption of this resolution occurred before Elon College made
any annexation efforts, Elon College had no jurisdiction to annex, even though it
completed its proceedings first.
Before examining potential implications of the prior jurisdiction rule, it is
useful to consider the various methods by which annexation may be accom-
plished in North Carolina. 25 Although the general assembly has the authority
to extend municipal boundaries by special act,2 6 it has also enacted statutes al-
lowing municipalities to extend their boundaries independent of the general as-
sembly. In recent years these more local forms of annexation have become
increasingly common.27
One method by which municipalities may annex without reference to the
general assembly or to the desires of citizens living in an area to be annexed is
the involuntary method prescribed by sections 160A-33 to -56 of the North Car-
olina General Statutes. 28 If the annexing body has at least 5000 citizens, it pro-
ceeds under sections 160A-33 to -44,29 the statutes under which Burlington
proceeded, and if it has fewer than 5000, it proceeds under sections 160A-45 to -
23. See infra notes 53-61 and accompanying text.
24. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-49(a) (1982) (current version at Id. § 160A-49(a) (Supp.
1983)). For a discussion of how the amended version of § 160A-49 might change the Burlington
court's determination that the resolution of intent is the first step, see infra text accompanying note
59.
25. N.C. CONsT. art. VII, § 1 gives the general assembly the power to create and control the
boundaries of cities and towns. The general assembly has delegated much of this power to the
municipalities, providing statutory means by which municipalities may effect annexation without
legislative action. When the general assembly has so delegated its authority, annexation is invalid
unless the municipalities comply with the statutory directives. Eg., In re Ordinance of Annexation
No. 1977-4, 296 N.C. 1, 16-17, 249 S.E.2d 698, 707 (1978) (quoting Huntley v. Potter, 255 N.C.
619, 627, 122 S.E.2d 681, 686 (1961)). "Substantial compliance" with the statutes, however, is prob-
ably sufficient. For a discussion of substantial compliance, see infra notes 67-83 and accompanying
text.
Despite the delegation of its annexation powers, the general assembly has retained the right to
annex by special legislative act, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-21 (1982), formerly the only means by
which annexation could be accomplished, Abbott v. Town of Highlands, 52 N.C. App. 69, 73, 277
S.E.2d 820, 823, disc rev. denied, 303 N.C. 710, 283 S.E.2d 136 (1981). Consideration of this
method of annexation is beyond the scope of this Note.
26. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-21 (1982).
27. See supra notes 6-8 and accompanying text.
28. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 160A-33 to -56 (1982 & Supp. 1983). The U.S. Advisory Commission
on Intergovernmental Relations has cited these statutes as model statutes. See NORTH CAROLINA
AssocIATION OF CouNTY CoMMIssIoNERs, supra note 2, at 2.
29. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-34 (1982) specifically limits the application of §§ 160A-33 to -44
to annexing cities of fewer than 5000 persons. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-33(4) (1982) notes that
because
urban development in and around municipalities having a population of less than 5000
persons tends to be concentrated close to the municipal boundary rather than being scat-
tered and dispersed as in the vicinity of larger municipalities... the legislative standards
governing annexation by smaller municipalities can be simpler than those for larger munic-
ipalities and still attain the objectives set forth in this section.
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56, the statutes under which Hudson proceeded. 30 To undertake this involun-
tary annexation, a municipality must be contiguous to at least one-eighth of the
proposed annexed area's boundaries, 31 the area proposed for annexation must
not already be part of another municipality,3 2 and the annexed area must be
developed for urban purposes. 33 Furthermore, a municipal governing board
must pass a resolution identifying an area under consideration for annexation3 4
30. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-46 (1982) specifically limits the application of§§ 160A-45 to -56
to annexing cities of 5000 or more persons. Section 160A-45(4) notes that
new urban development in and around municipalities having a population of 5000 or more
persons is more scattered than in and around smaller municipalities, and that such larger
municipalities have greater difficulty in expanding municipal utility systems and other ser-
vice facilities to serve such scattered development, so that the legislative standards gov-
erning annexation by larger municipalities must take these facts into account if the
objectives set forth in this section are to be attained.
31. Id. §§ 160A-36Qo)(2), -48(b)(2). The definition of "contiguous" for involuntary annexation,
set forth in §§ 160A-41(l) and 160A-53(1) is, with a few semantic changes, the same as the defini-
tion of "contiguous" for voluntary annexation under § 160A-31(f), infra note 39.
32. Id. §§ 16oA-36(b)(3), -48(b)(3).
33. Section 160A-36(c) sets forth the "urban purposes" requirement for annexation by cities of
fewer than 5000 persons:
An area developed for urban purposes is defined as any area which is so developed that at
least sixty percent (60%) of the total number of lots and tracts in the area at the time of
annexation are used for residential, commercial, industrial, institutional, or governmental
purposes, and is subdivided into lots and tracts such that at least sixty percent (60%) of the
total acreage, not counting the acreage used at the time of annexation for commercial,
industrial, governmental, or institutional purposes, consists of lots and tracts five acres or
less in size.
Id. § 160A-36(c). Section 160A-48(c) defines an area developed for "urban purposes" when annexa-
tion is sought by a city of 5000 or more persons. Id. § 160A-48(c) (Supp. 1983). Such an area:
(1) Has a total resident population equal to at least two persons for each acre of land
included in its boundaries; or
(2) Has a total resident population equal to at least one person for each acre of land
included within its boundaries, and is subdivided into lots and tracts such that at least sixty
percent (60%) of the total acreage consists of lots and tracts five acres or less in size and
such that at least sixty-five percent (65%) of the total number of lots and tracts are one
acre or less in size; or
(3) Is so developed that at least sixty percent (60%) of the total number of lots and
tracts in the area at the time of annexation are used for residential, commercial, industrial,
institutional, or governmental purposes, and is subdivided into lots and tracts such that at
least sixty percent (60%) of the total acreage, not counting the acreage used at the time of
annexation for commercial, industrial, governmental or institutional purposes, consists of
lots and tracts five acres or less in size.
Id. Cities of 5000 or more persons may also annex an area that does not meet the requirements of
§ 160A-48(c) but:
(1) Lies between the municipal boundary and an area developed for urban purposes so
that the area developed for urban purposes is either not adjacent to the municipal bound-
ary or cannot be served by the municipality without extending services and/or water and/
or sewer lines through such sparsely developed area; or
(2) Is adjacent, on at least sixty percent (60%) of its external boundary, to any combi-
nation of the municipal boundary and the boundary of an area or areas developed for
urban purposes as defined in subsection (c).
Id. § 160A-48(d) (1982).
Huntley v. Potter, 255 N.C. 619, 629, 122 S.E.2d 681, 688 (1961) remanded for specification an
ordinance which stated in conclusory terms that the area being annexed was developed for urban
purposes.
34. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 160A-37(i)-("), -49(i)-() (Supp. 1983). The requirement for adoption
of an identifying resolution appears in an amended version of the statute not in effect when Burling-
ton annexed under the involuntary procedures. For a discussion of the effect the amendment might
have on the operation of the prior jurisdiction doctrine, see infra text accompanying note 59.
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and a resolution of intent to annex. 35 The local board must prepare a report
setting forth proposed boundary changes and proposed plans for extending mu-
nicipal services to the area to be annexed. 36 Finally, a notice of public hearing
and a public hearing are required before the local board may enact an annexa-
tion ordinance. 37
"Voluntary" proceedings are another means by which North Carolina mu-
nicipalities may annex without legislative action.38 Unlike involuntary proceed-
ings, residents of the area to be annexed must initiate and consent to voluntary
proceedings. Voluntary proceedings may accomplish the annexation of both
contiguous 39 and satellite 4° areas. If the area to be annexed meets either the
definition of "contiguous" or the definition of "satellite," annexation may be
initiated by a petition signed by all residents of the proposed annexation area.4 1
The voluntary procedures further require public notice and a hearing prior to
enactment of an annexation ordinance by the local board.4 2
Because two or more North Carolina municipalities could satisfy the statu-
tory prerequisites for annexation and could attempt annexation at the same
time, a rule to govern which proceeding would prevail in those circumstances is
necessary. Such a rule should ensure that annexation proceedings are predict-
able and orderly and that the better conceived plan, which furthers the interests
of the greatest number of persons in an urban area, prevails. The recently
adopted prior jurisdiction rule seems suited to address most of these concerns
because it embodies certain of the policy objectives of annexation. Alternatives
to the prior jurisdiction rule, however, also could address these concerns.
Perhaps the most significant attribute of the prior jurisdiction rule is that it
enhances the predictability and order of annexation proceedings. A rule declar-
ing as the winner the first municipality to complete its proceedings would only
encourage North Carolina municipalities to rush annexation proceedings in or-
der to thwart the success of other proceedings begun earlier. In North Carolina
each annexation method takes a different amount of time to complete, and thus
it is possible, as in Burlington, that the second annexation to begin will be the
first completed. Because the prior jurisdiction rule looks to the time of coin-
35. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 160A-37(a), -49(a) (Supp. 1983).
36. Id. §§ 160A-35, -47 (1982 & Supp. 1983).
37. Id. §§ 160A-37(b) to (e), -49(b) to (e).
38. Id. § 160A-31 (1982).
39. Section 160A-31 defines an area as "contiguous" if
such area either abuts directly on the municipal boundary or is separated from the munici-
pality by a street or a street right-of-way, a creek or a river, or the right-of-way of a
railroad or other public service corporation, lands owned by the municipality or some
other political subdivision, or lands owned by the state of North Carolina.
Id. § 160A-31(f).
40. Id. § 160A-58 to -58.6. This statute defines "satellite corporate limits" as "the corporate
limits of a noncontiguous area annexed pursuant to this Part or a local act authorizing or effecting
noncontiguous annexations." Id. § 160A-58(3). For further discussion of limitations on annexation
of a satellite, see infra note 81.
41. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 160A-31(a), -58.1(a) (1982).
42. Id. §§ 160A-31(c)-(d), -58.2.
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mencement rather than to the time of completion of proceedings, 43 it guarantees
that the first annexation proceedings begun will not be undermined by subse-
quently initiated plans. Thus, the rule ensures predictability and eliminates the
incentive for a rush to the finish line.
Because both the Hudson rule and the first-completed rule favor voluntary
procedures, 44 which are undertaken with the blessing of residents in an area to
be annexed, either rule arguably is preferable to the prior jurisdiction rule, which
is blind to the nature of the competing proceedings and thus ignores the desires
of residents. Furthermore, the voluntary procedures may have been preferred
by the general assembly, for, as noted by the Hudson court,4 5 they are quicker
than the involuntary procedures. Considerable commentary, however, suggests
that individual desires should not be paramount in annexation. Elaborating on
the necessity of subordinating individual desires to effectuate sound urban devel-
opment, a government study commission in 1958 declared:
[W]e believe in the essential rights of every person, but we believe that
the rights and privileges of residents of urban fringe areas must be in-
terpreted in the context of the rights and privileges of every person in
the urban area. We do not believe that an individual who chooses to
buy a lot and build a home in the vicinity of a city thereby acquires the
right to stand in the way of action which is deemed necessary for the
good of the entire urban area. By his very choice to build and live in
the vicinity of a city, he has chosen to identify himself with an urban
population, to assume the responsibilities of urban living, and to reap
the benefits of such location. Therefore, sooner or later his property
must become subject to the regulations and services that have been
found necessary and indispensable to the health, welfare, safety, con-
venience, and general prosperity of the entire urban area.46
Although this policy appears to deprive property owners of their liberty, it
is consistent with the maxim that an individual's property rights are only those
that the law chooses to acknowledge. The policy also recognizes than an organ-
ized society is more far-sighted than are self-interested individuals. Individuals
are more likely to resist annexation because of personal grievances or fears about
a neighboring municipality and to seek annexation by one municipality solely to
prevent annexation by another, precisely the scenario that led to the Hudson and
Burlington cases.47 In doing so individuals probably will not consider either the
likely impact of annexation on an entire urban area or whether one municipality
43. 2 E. MCQUILLAN, supra note 22, § 7.22(a), at 378.
44. A rule that would declare as the winner the first to the finish line almost always would favor
the voluntarily annexing municipality because the voluntary procedures require less time to com-
plete than do the involuntary procedures. The disparity in the time required to complete the various
proceedings was noted in Hudson, 279 N.C. at 161, 181 S.E.2d at 447. The voluntary proceeding
would win consistently if the Hudson rule governed annexation disputes because that rule favors
voluntary proceedings.
45. Id.
46. MuNIcIPAL GOVERNMENT STUDY CoMMIssION, supra note 4, at 19-21 (quoted in Burling-
ton, 310 N.C. at 729-30, 314 S.E.2d at 538).
47. See Burlington, 310 N.C. at 724-25, 314 S.E.2d at 535; Hudson, 279 N.C. at 157-58, 181
S.E.2d at 444.
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is better equipped than another to extend municipal service to an annexed area.
Moreover, residents of a territory under consideration for annexation might seek
incorporation as a means of thwarting a neighboring municipality's annexation
efforts. Such rushed incorporation might lead to unnecessary fragmentation of
municipal services and leave North Carolina a conglomerate of tiny municipal
corporations, none of which would be large enough to provide its inhabitants the
diversity and quality of services more easily afforded by a larger entity.
48 That
courts have so readily adopted the prior jurisdiction rule rather than one favor-
ing the preferences of local residents demonstrates that the policy underlying
annexation subordinates individual desires to the orderly growth of cities and
the convenience, health, and safety of entire urban areas.49
Certainly not all initial, involuntary annexation attempts are entirely no-
ble50 for municipalities might be as greedy and short-sighted as individuals. The
first municipality to begin proceedings may well seek to annex merely as a polit-
ical expediency. 51 The first municipality to initiate proceedings might also see
"an area, which will certainly be vital to [its] development in the foreseeable
future, threatened by the possibility of a rival annexation or incorporation, [and]
force. . . a premature annexation of the territory in order to protect its inter-
ests."' 52 Thus, a subsequently begun annexation attempt, whether voluntary or
involuntary, does not always present the worse alternative; the second munici-
pality is not necessarily less deserving of or less able to serve a new area than is
the first municipality to begin its proceedings.
Although none of the alternatives-the first-completed rule, the Hudson
rule, or the prior jurisdiction rule-is without drawbacks, the policy statements
and the universal acceptance of the prior jurisdiction rule suggest widespread
agreement that proceedings first begun are more likely to be well conceived than
those subsequently begun. Both Hudson and Burlington support this conclu-
sion; in each the subsequently begun proceeding was voluntary and little more
than a response to an earlier-begun proceeding. Moreover, although none of the
rules can guarantee that the best annexation plan will win, the prior jurisdiction
rule does ensure greater predictability than the alternatives. Measuring priority
from the date of commencement determines the outcome from the beginning,
48. The 1958 Study Commission observed
urban areas where the fringe is not unincorporated but a tangled thicket of small, finan-
cially weak and competing towns and special districts. In these areas it is impossible to
find any one governmental unit which has the jurisdiction or financial ability to provide
those services and facilities which are essential to the development of the entire urban area.
MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT STUDY COMMIssION, supra note 4, at 19-21.
49. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 160A-33(l), -45(1) (1982 & Supp. 1983) (setting forth as the pol-
icy behind involuntary annexation "tihat sound urban development is essential to the continued
economic development of North Carolina").
50. "Some annexations have been attempted for less noble reasons. So-called land grabs for
additional tax revenues, for increasing the area or population of the city as an end in itself, and
competitive annexation to thwart anticipated annexation by another jurisdiction, have usually
proved to be unwise actions." DEPARTMENT OF URBAN STUDIEs NATIONAL LEAGUE OF CrrIEs,
supra note 3, at 2.
51. Yeager, City and Town Boundaries-Incorporation, Consolidation, Annexation, and Sever-
ance Under the Iowa Statutes, 19 DRAKE L. REv. 1, 29 (1969).
52. Id. at 29-30.
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whereas a rule looking to the date of completion would lead to uncertainty
throughout the annexation process. A rule favoring voluntary proceedings
would make an involuntary proceeding even more uncertain since the involun-
tary proceeding could be thwarted at any time by a voluntary one. Therefore,
given the alternatives, the prior jurisdiction rule seems a practical choice.
North Carolina, having only recently adopted the prior jurisdiction rule,
has yet to refine the doctrine to specify the limits of its application. One neces-
sary refinement is the determination of what marks commencement of proceed-
ings for purposes of acquiring prior jurisdiction. Another is a determination of
how defective a proceeding must be before it will lose the benefits of prior juris-
diction. North Carolina courts also have yet to determine how quickly an an-
nexing municipality must complete proceedings in order to retain prior
jurisdiction.
Typically, proceedings are commenced for prior jurisdiction purposes when
the "first mandatory public procedural step" in the statutory process is taken.
5 3
In North Carolina there is more than one statutory means of annexation,5 4 so
the first step will not be the same for all proceedings. The city of Burlington
pursued annexation under the involuntary procedures permitting a city of 5000
or more persons to annex unilaterally;5 5 the involuntary procedures for smaller
cities are functionally identical.5 6 Under these statutes at the time Burlington
annexed, the first directive was that an annexing municipality adopt a resolution
of intent,5 7 and it was the adoption of such a resolution that marked the "first
mandatory public procedural step" in that case.5 8
A 1983 amendment to section 160A-49 of the North Carolina General Stat-
utes, however, might have created a new first step in this particular statutory
process.5 9 The amendment, effective for resolutions of intent adopted on or after
July 1, 1984, requires that at least one year prior to adopting the resolution of
intent, a municipal governing board adopt a resolution identifying an area under
consideration for annexation. A muncipality may annex without the identifying
53. 2 E. McQuILLAN, supra note 22, § 7.22(a), at 378.
54. The statutory methods of annexation discussed in this Note are those that the municipali-
ties may pursue without a specific act of the general assembly because these are the methods in
which municipalities will more likely conflict with one another. Another means of annexation, an-
nexation by special act of the general assembly, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-21 (1982), will not be
discussed in this Note in view of the intricacies of relations between the State and local bodies.
55. Id. §§ 16OA-45 to -56 (1982 & Supp. 1983).
56. Id. §§ 160A-33 to -44. Given the statutory similarity, the "first mandatory public proce-
dural step" in the involuntary process should be the same for both small and large municipalities.
57. Id. § 160A-49(a). An amendment to this statute, effective in 1984, prescribes another step
before the adoption of the resolution of intent, namely adoption of a resolution identifying an area
under consideration for annexation. Id. § 160A-49(i)-j) (Supp. 1983). The statutes governing in-
voluntary annexation by a smaller municipality were similarly amended. Id. § 160A-37(i)-(j). For
a discussion of this amendment, see infra text accompanying note 59.
58. Burlington, 310 N.C. at 728, 314 S.E.2d at 537. A North Carolina decision prior to Bur-
lington had determined that adoption of the resolution of intent "mark[s] the formal beginning of the
municipality's actions." Kritzer v. Town of Southern Pines, 33 N.C. App. 152, 155, 234 S.E.2d 648,
651 (1977). Interestingly, in City of Muscatine v. Waters, 251 N.E.2d 544 (Iowa 1977), similar
annexation proceedings were not officially begun for prior jurisdiction purposes until there was pub-
lication of notice of a public hearing on the proposed annexation.
59. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-48(i)-(j) (Supp. 1983).
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resolution, but in that event the ordinance annexing the particular area will not
be effective until one year after the date of its adoption. Because there is an
alternative to adoption of the identifying resolution, that resolution might not be
deemed the "first mandatory public procedural step" for prior jurisdiction pur-
poses. Since the identifying resolution is directed by the statute, however, it
should be considered official and public enough to be the "first mandatory pub-
lic procedural step." In fact, if the identifying resolution is not deemed to mark
the first step, no municipality concerned about protection from competing an-
nexation will adopt it; there will be a one-year wait whether a municipality
adopts an identifying resolution or a resolution of intent, and it would be safer
for a municipality to adopt a resolution of intent so that it could be assured the
protection of the prior jurisdiction rule. If the new amendment is to have vital-
ity, courts need to interpret it as giving jurisdictional priority to municipalities
that choose the identifying resolution alternative.
The voluntary procedures for annexation of both a contiguous area6° under
section 160A-31 and a satellite area6 ' under section 160A-58 require a petition
signed by all owners of real property in the area to be annexed. 62 The receipt of
this petition probably marks the "first mandatory public procedural step" of
these processes. The Hudson case, which involved an involuntary and a volun-
tary proceeding, is unclear on whether the receipt of the petition by the local
governing board or the investigation and certification of the petition's accuracy
marks the beginning of voluntary proceedings. In reciting the facts, the court
indicated that the voluntary procedure was initiated when investigation and cer-
tification of the petition were complete.63 In the text of the opinion, however,
the court detailed the steps taken to commence the proceedings and included the
presentation of the petition to the governing board.64 Under the precedent of
other jurisdictions, presentation and receipt of the petition is sufficiently "pub-
lic" to mark the beginning of proceedings.
65
Other jurisdictions have determined that the advantages of prior jurisdic-
tion do not accrue to a municipality not complying with applicable statutes, even
though that municipality commenced its proceedings first.66 North Carolina
has yet to decide how rigidly a municipality must comply with the letter of the
statutes in order to obtain and retain prior jurisdiction. Because "substantial
60. For a definition of contiguous, see supra note 39.
61. For a general definition of satellite, see supra note 40.
62. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 160A-31(a), -58.1(a) (1982).
63. Hudson, 279 N.C. at 158, 181 S.E.2d at 445.
64. Id. at 162, 181 S.E.2d at 447.
65. See Comment, Municipal Corporations: Prior Jurisdiction Rule, 7 WAKE FOREsT L. REV.
77-83 (1970-71). In jurisdictions in which the statutory procedure for annexation requires publica-
tion of notice prior to circulation of a petition, courts have held that the first public step for purposes
of prior jurisdiction is the posting of this notice. Village of Brown Deer v. City of Milwaukee, 274
Wis. 50, 58, 79 N.W.2d 340, 345 (1956); Town of Greenfield v. City of Milwaukee, 259 Wis. 77, 83,
47 N.W.2d 292, 296 (1951). In other jurisdictions which, like North Carolina, require a petition but
no posting of notice that a petition will be circulated, however, the first public step is the filing of the
petition with the local governing board. Greenfield, 259 Wis. at 83, 47 N.W.2d at 296.
66. 2 E. McQuILLAN, supra note 22, § 7.22(a), at 378. See also Town of Clive v. Colby, 455
Iowa 483, 496-97, 123 N.W.2d 331, 333 (1963) (supplemental opinion); State ex rel. Village of
Orono v. Village of Long Lake, 274 Minn. 264, 273-74, 77 N.W.2d 46, 52 (1956).
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compliance with the statutes," 67 as opposed to absolute compliance, has been
sufficient when a single North Carolina municipality has attempted to annex,6 8
less than meticulous compliance with the details of the statutes probably should
not cause one municipality competing with another to lose its jurisdictional pri-
ority. Even when there have been "procedural irregularities [in an annexation
proceeding which were] found to have materially prejudiced the substantive
rights of. .. petitioners" 69 and the annexation ordinance has been remanded to
the local governing board for amendment as directed by the statute, the amend-
ments have not always been serious enough to require a second public hearing.70
The cases in which deficiencies requiring remand have not been serious enough
to require a second public hearing might be good precedent for what deficiencies
will allow a municipality to retain prior jurisdiction. On the other hand, when
there is a capable, competing municipality waiting in the wings, a judge may not
be predisposed to wink at statutory deficiencies. A stricter application of the
statutes for purposes of prior jurisdiction could well ensure greater obedience to
the statutes by municipalities concerned about a potential competing annexa-
tion. In turn, the quality of annexation proceedings generally would improve.
Although complete, literal compliance with every requirement of the invol-
untary annexation statute should not be necessary for a municipality to claim
exclusive jurisdiction over an area, the physical conditions required-that at
least one-eighth of the proposed annexed area's boundaries coincide with the
annexing municipality's primary limits, 71 that the proposed annexation area not
be a part of another municipality,72 and that the proposed annexation area be
developed for urban purposes73-should be followed strictly.74 These condi-
tions are jurisdictional requirements, and "if they do not exist, any attempts to
67. Eg., Scovill Mfg. Co. v. Town of Wake Forest, 58 N.C. App. 15, 23, 293 S.E.2d 240, 246
(1982).
68. Eg., City of Conover v. City of Newton, 297 N.C. 506, 521-22, 256 S.E.2d 216, 226 (1979)
(failure of a resolution of intent to detail correctly the metes and bounds description of an area to be
annexed was not fatal to validity of involuntary proceeding because maps available for public inspec-
tion correctly depicted the area); Dunn v. City of Charlotte, 284 N.C. 542, 201 S.E.2d 873 (1974)
(failure to include in annexation report a proposed timetable for extension of municipal services to
annexed area, though required by statute, did not preclude substantial compliance and did not affect
the complainant's substantive rights); In re Annexation Ordinance Adopted by New Bern, 278 N.C.
641, 180 S.E.2d 851 (1971) (failure to have city official explain at public hearing plans for extension
of city services to an area proposed for annexation, though required by statute, did not materially
affect the substantial rights of complaining parties because the report itself was clear and under-
standable); Adams-Millis Corp. v. Town of Kernersville, 6 N.C. App. 78, 169 S.E.2d 496 (1969)
(failure to extend the period for public inspection of annexation plans after amending the plans did
not harm petitioner).
69. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 160A-38(g), -50(g) (1982).
70. See Gregory v. Town of Plymouth, 60 N.C. App. 431, 299 S.E.2d 232 (1983) (no required
rehearing regarding amended report for extension of municipal services when report merely clarified
the specifics of what services would be extended and how those services would be financed).
71. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 160A-36(b)(2), -48(b)(2) (1982); Hawks v. Town of Valdese, 299 N.C.
1, 261 S.E.2d 90 (1980) (requirement of contiguousness not satisfied when boundaries of the annexed
area coincide with an annexing city's satellite limits but not with its "primary" limits).
72. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 160A-36(b)(3), -48(b)(3) (1982).
73. Id. §§ 160A-48(c)-(d), -36(c) (1982 & Supp. 1983). For discussion of the meaning of "ur-
ban purposes," see supra note 33.
74. See Town of Clive v. Colby, 255 Iowa 483, 123 N.W.2d 331 (1963) (supplemental opinion);
State ex rel. Village of Orono, 247 Minn. 264, 77 N.W.2d 46 (1956).
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annex are of no legal consequence." '75 Moreover, the annexing city must con-
form to the requirement that it have the ability to extend municipal services to
the area it seeks to annex.76 Because these requirements directly affect the need
for a particular "urban" area to be annexed and the ability of an annexing city to
accommodate additional territory, the policy behind annexation dictates that
they be followed strictly. Otherwise, the purpose behind allowing involuntary
annexation-that sound urban development be effected by extension of munici-
pal services into areas where population, industry, and other activity are concen-
trated77-is not operative.
Having satisfied the prerequisites for involuntary annexation, an annexing
municipality probably will have to take the major procedural steps to be able to
take advantage of the prior jurisdiction rule. In addition to adopting resolutions
of identification and intent,78 these steps include issuing a report setting forth
proposed boundary changes and plans for extending municipal services to the
area to be annexed, 79 publishing notice of a public hearing and conducting a
public hearing prior to officially enacting an annexation ordinance.8 0 Citizens
are given early notice that annexation is being considered through the public
adoption of resolutions, are informed of the nature and potential effects of this
boundary extension by the report, and are given a voice in the proposed change
by the notice and public hearing. Because these steps inform citizens about the
annexation and give them a chance to express their opinions, they should not be
omitted. If these general steps are taken, however, specific irregularities within
the hearing or the report should not be deemed to preclude "substantial compli-
ance" so long as the citizens' rights to be informed and heard are not
undermined.
The same conclusions that apply to involuntary proceedings should apply
to voluntary ones. First, the annexing municipality must make sure that all
physical conditions for jurisdiction to annex are strictly met.8 1 Second, a peti-
75. Yeager, supra note 51, at 17. As a practical matter, these jurisdictional prerequisites will be
met completely or not at all because they are primarily all-or-nothing type requirements; thus, there
will not be "substantial compliance" with them.
76. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 160A-35, -47 (1982 & Supp. 1983). See Town of Clive v. Colby, 255
Iowa 483, 123 N.W.2d 331 (1963) (supplemental opinion) (no jurisdiction to annex because of failure
to show capability to extend municipal services to proposed annexation area); In re Annexation
Ordinance Adopted by Jacksonville, 255 N.C. 633, 646-47, 122 S.E.2d 690, 700 (1961) (plans for
extension of services condition precedent to annexation); Gregory v. Town of Plymouth, 60 N.C.
App. 431, 433, 299 S.E.2d 232, 234 (original ordinance remanded to local board to add details of
extension of municipal services to annexed area), cert denied, 308 N.C. 544, 304 S.E.2d 237 (1983).
77. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 160A-33, -45 (1982).
78. For discussion of the resolutions of identification and of intent, see supra notes 57-59 and
accompanying text.
79. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 160A-35, -47 (1982 & Supp. 1983).
80. Id. §§ 160A-37, -49.
81. Section 160A-31 requires that a contiguous area, to be annexed as such, meet the statutory
definition of "contiguous." Id. § 160A-31 (1982). For that statutory definition, see supra note 39.
Conditions for annexation of satellites are more rigorous. See N.C GEN. STAT. § 160A-
58.1(b)(1982). A city may not annex a satellite area that is not within three miles of the annexing
city's primary limits, id. § 160A-58.1(b)(1), or that is closer to the primary limits of another city
than to the annexing city. Id. § 160A-58.1(b)(2). Any subdivision in the satellite area must be
wholly included in the annexation. Id. § 160A-58.1(b)(4). The annexing city also must be capable of
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tion requesting annexation signed by all residents of the area to be annexed must
be received and certified by the local governing board.82 Last, there must be
notice and a public hearing about the proposed annexation. 83 As with the invol-
untary proceedings, something short of strict compliance with the details of
these steps should suffice to maintain prior jurisdiction, but the steps themselves
should be substantially taken.
Finally, North Carolina must determine how long an acquired jurisdic-
tional priority lasts. The general law is that "the right of priority in order of
time may be lost if proceedings, once instituted, are not completed within a rea-
sonable time."' 84 As with all invocations of the word "reasonable," what is a
reasonable amount of time depends on the circumstances of each case. 85 Key
factors will be whether annexation is pursued actively and whether there is a
projected date for completion of the proceedings. 86 Beyond these general con-
siderations, North Carolina courts will have to define more specifically what
amount of time is reasonable.
That the only two North Carolina cases involving competition for annexa-
tion are Hudson and Burlington suggests that adoption of a rule to govern such
competition is a relatively insignificant event. The increasing population of
North Carolina's cities, however, and their need to expand and accommodate
that population probably mean that disputes of the Burlington variety will multi-
ply in the future.87 The mere existence of the prior jurisdiction rule might have
the beneficial effect of discouraging residents of an area targeted for involuntary
annexation by a neighboring municipality from seeking voluntary annexation by
a different municipality. Because the prior jurisdiction rule does not counte-
nance such efforts, annexation will be well considered rather than purely reac-
tive. Even though the rule will prevent some annexation conflicts from arising,
other fights over priority to annex are inevitable. These fights will result from
the increased need for annexation and from the variety of annexation procedures
available in North Carolina, procedures that do not require that annexation of a
particular area be by a particular municipality. The rule of prior jurisdiction
providing municipal services to the satellite area equivalent to the services already provided citizens
of the annexing city. Id. § 160A-58.1(b)(3). Finally, the annexation of the new satellite area, when
added to all other satellites of the annexing city, must not result in the city having more than 10% of
its area within satellite boundaries. Id. § 160A-58.1(b)(5).
82. Id. §§ 160A-31(a), -58.1(a). The court in City of Conover v. City of Newton, 297 N.C.
506, 256 S.E.2d 216 (1979), stated that withdrawal of six required signatures from the petition prior
to completion of proceedings invalidates a voluntary annexation attempt.
83. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 160A-31(c) to -31(d), -58.2 (1982).
84. 2 E. MCQUILLIN, supra note 22, § 7.22(a), at 378-79. See also Town of Clive v. Colby, 255
Iowa 483, 492, 121 N.W.2d 115, 120 (1963) ("proceedings should be conducted with reasonable
dispatch and completed within a reasonable time"); Yeager, supra note 51, at 16-17 (reciting the
facts of Clive); Comment, supra note 65, at 84 (annexation and incorporation proceedings must be
completed within a reasonable time or else exclusive jurisdiction is lost).
85. See City of Muscatine v. Waters, 251 N.W.2d 544 (Iowa 1977) (more than one year to
complete annexation is not unreasonable given the circumstances); In re Incorporation of Brown
Deer, 267 Wis. 481, 484-85, 66 N.W.2d 333, 335-36 (1954) (although annexing city acted in good
faith, it lost its prior jurisdiction because annexation efforts were moving slowly and completion of
proceedings was not expected for two years); Yeager, supra note 51, at 16-17.
86. Comment, supra note 65, at 84.
87. See id at 79-80.
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should provide a fair and practical method for settling these disputes and should
be even more useful when the problems discussed by this Note-when the prior
jurisdiction rule is invoked, when annexation is too defective to merit the re-
wards of the prior jurisdiction rule, and when an annexation proceeding must be
completed in order to retain the benefits of the rule-are resolved.
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